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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
10 WESTERN DIVISION

11 CENOBIO H. HERRERA, SR., } Case No. 2:23-cv-01162-DSF-JDE  
12 Petitioner, }  
13 v. } ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY  
14 WARDEN OF FCI LOMPOC, } THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE  
15 Respondent. } DISMISSED  
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19 I.

20 INTRODUCTION

21 On February 14, 2023, Petitioner Cenobio H. Herrera, Sr. (Lanz)  
22 (“Petitioner”), a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in  
23 Lompoc, California, proceeding pro se and without paying the required filing  
24 fee or seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed a one-page “Petition for  
25 a Writ of Habeas Corpus 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” seeking an order directing the  
26 Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to “Apply My First Step Act Credits  
27 (“FSA”), Elderly Offender Credit, And Good Time Credits (“GTC”).” Dkt. 1  
28 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). Petitioner was previously deemed a vexatious litigant,

1 and by prior order, is required to obtain a court order or written authorization  
2 to proceed with certain actions. See United States v. Herrera, et al., Case No.  
3 2:02-cr-00531-RSWL (C.D. Cal.) (“Underlying Action”), Dkt. 447. The  
4 Petition has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for preliminary  
5 review and consideration.

6 A habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is subject to the same  
7 screening requirements that apply to habeas petitions brought under 28 U.S.C.  
8 § 2254. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District  
9 Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Habeas Rules”), Habeas Rule 1(b) (providing that  
10 district courts may apply the Habeas Rules to habeas petitions that are not  
11 brought under § 2254); Lane v. Feather, 584 F. App’x 843, 843 (9th Cir. 2014)  
12 (affirming district court’s application of Habeas Rule 4 to dismiss a Section  
13 2241 petition). Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules, the Court  
14 is required to “promptly examine” the Petition and, “[i]f it plainly appears  
15 from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to  
16 relief,” the Court “must dismiss the petition.”

17 The undersigned has reviewed the Petition under Rule 4 of the Habeas  
18 Rules and finds the Petition is subject to dismissal for the reasons explained  
19 below.

## 20 II.

### 21 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

22 In March 2003, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of  
23 conspiracy to aid and abet manufacturing of methamphetamine and to possess  
24 pseudoephedrine knowing and having reasonable cause to believe it would be  
25 used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,  
26 841(a)(1), 841(C)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; two counts of possession of  
27 pseudoephedrine knowing and having reasonable cause to believe it would be  
28 used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2);

1 conspiracy to money launder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1956(a)(1),  
 2 and 1957; and several counts of laundering of monetary instruments, aiding  
 3 and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  
 4 Underlying Action, Dkt. 130, 133, 182-183.<sup>1</sup> In December 2003, Petitioner was  
 5 sentenced to 360 months of incarceration. Pet. at 1; Underlying Action, Dkt.  
 6 182-183. Petitioner appealed the judgment, which was affirmed in part and  
 7 remanded in part by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on January 23, 2007.  
 8 United States v. Herrera, Case No. 04-50000 (9th Cir.), Dkt. 92. A petition for  
 9 rehearing was denied on February 26, 2007. Id., Dkt. 100.

10 On August 28, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to  
 11 vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. Underlying Action, Dkt. 341. On  
 12 October 16, 2009, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed this motion, entered by the  
 13 district court on December 23, 2009. Id., Dkt. 362, 372. Petitioner filed a  
 14 second motion under Section 2255 on December 20, 2011, which was denied  
 15 on January 17, 2013. Id., Dkt. 403, 412.

16 In July 2011, Petitioner filed a Section 2241 petition, which was  
 17 dismissed because his claims were not cognizable in a federal habeas petition.  
 18 See Herrera, Sr. v. Sanders, Case No. 2:11-cv-06196-RSWL-MAN (C.D. Cal.),  
 19 Dkt. 1, 3-4. Less than a month later, Petitioner filed another habeas petition  
 20 under Section 2241 challenging a restitution order. Herrera, Sr. v. Sanders,  
 21 Case No. 2:11-cv-06486-RSWL-MAN (C.D. Cal.), Dkt. 1. That petition was  
 22 dismissed with prejudice on October 1, 2012. Id., Dkt. 15. A third habeas  
 23 petition under Section 2241 was “essentially a re-hash” of his first habeas  
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25 <sup>1</sup> The Court takes judicial notice of the relevant federal records available  
 26 electronically. See United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir.  
 27 2018) (“A court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record,  
 28 which may include court records available through [the Public Access to Court  
 Electronic Records].”); Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking  
 judicial notice of opinion and briefs filed in another proceeding).

petition and dismissed without prejudice on February 8, 2012. See Herrera, Sr. v. Sanders, 2:12-cv-00976-JSL-MAN (C.D. Cal.), Dkt. 1, 3, 4.

Meanwhile, on October 10, 2013, Petitioner was declared a vexatious litigant, with the District Judge finding Petitioner had an “extensive history of frivolous litigation” in the Underlying Action, raising “patently meritless positions.” Underlying Action, Dkt. 447 (“Vexatious Litigant Order”) at 6, 10, 13-14. Under the Vexatious Litigant Order, Petitioner is prohibited from filing documents that:

(1) contest the jurisdiction of this Court over his conviction, (2) is a non-motion or contract-style filing such as, but not limited to, a Notice, Covenant, Warrant, Offer of Proof, Conditional Acceptance, Waiver of Tort, Presentment, Letter, Claim for Damage or Injury, or similar filings which reference tort claims, non-corporate status, debtors, interpleaders, damages, property claims, chattel, contracts, agents, principals, or rescission, or (3) without obtaining the prior approval of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, request relief which would be appropriately addressed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Vexatious Litigant Order at 13-14. On July 28, 2014, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Vexatious Litigant Order. Underlying Action, Dkt. 454.

Since that time, Petitioner has continued to seek release. For instance, on April 22, 2019, Petitioner filed a request for sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) based on the First Step Act of 2018 and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Underlying Action, Dkt. 486. On July 29, 2019, the district court denied the motion pursuant to the First Step Act (id., Dkt. 492), and denied the motion as to Amendment 782 on October 10, 2019. Id., Dkt. 502. On January 23, 2020, Petitioner filed another motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Section 3582(c), which was denied on April 24, 2020. Id.,

1 Dkt. 511, 536. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a renewed motion for  
2 compassionate release on May 18, 2020, which was denied on August 10,  
3 2020. Id., Dkt. 546, 557. That decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on  
4 June 29, 2021. Id., Dkt. 562. On March 4, 2022, Petitioner filed another  
5 motion to reduce sentence pursuant to the First Step Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3585,  
6 which was denied on May 9, 2022. Id., Dkt. 570, 582. On October 12, 2022,  
7 Petitioner filed another motion for reduction of sentence in the Underlying  
8 Action, which was denied on February 7, 2023. Id., Dkt. 595, 617.

9 On October 21, 2022, Petitioner filed another habeas petition under 28  
10 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release on home confinement under the Coronavirus  
11 Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, and asserting alleged  
12 failures to comply with an injunction in another action and inadequate medical  
13 care, which was dismissed on January 18, 2023. See Herrera, Sr. v. Birkholz,  
14 Case No. 2:22-cv-07784-RSWL-JDE (C.D. Cal.), Dkt. 10 (Report and  
15 Recommendation of Assigned Magistrate Judge recommending dismissal),  
16 Dkt. 11 (Order Accepting Report and Recommendation, dismissing action),  
17 Dkt. 12 (Judgment of Dismissal). Petitioner also recently had a civil rights  
18 complaint dismissed. Herrera, Sr. v. US Attorney California-Central, Case No.  
19 2:22-cv-04245-GW-AGR (C.D. Cal.), Dkt. 18 (Order of Dismissal dated  
20 January 19, 2023).

21 As noted, the Court received the instant Petition on February 14, 2023.

### 22 III.

### 23 SUMMARY OF THE PETITION

24 In the one-page Petition, Petitioner appear to argue that the BOP  
25 wrongfully denied him certain credits toward early release under the First Step  
26 Act, the “Elderly Offender Credit” and “Good Time Credits” due to Petitioner  
27 having been found to be a “leader/organizer of criminal activity,” which  
28 Petitioner asserts, is a “made up policy of the BOP as [the First Step Act],

1 Elderly Offender Credit and the [Good Time Credits] has no such rule within  
2 the statutes.” Pet. at 1. Petitioner also argues that the BOP is “reneging in  
3 accepting [his] officially given documents from the Department of Defense”  
4 which, Petitioner argues, recognize that he is a United States citizen as a result  
5 of his military service in combat, and asks the Court to “recognize” his status.  
6 In conclusion, Petitioner asks the Court to order the BOP “to apply [his] [First  
7 Step Act], Elder Offender Credits, [his] [Good Time Credits] as statutorily  
8 required, and the fact that the Department of Defense granted [his] full  
9 citizenship of the United States which [he] earned back in the year 1966, as  
10 was done officially.” Id.

#### 11 IV.

#### 12 DISCUSSION

13 A petition for writ of habeas corpus may lie under 28 U.S.C.  
14 § 2241(c)(3), subject to other limitations, if the petitioner “is in custody in  
15 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Here,  
16 Petitioner does not challenge the lawfulness of his underlying conviction or  
17 sentence. Rather, Petitioner asks the Court to order the BOP to “apply” certain  
18 credits to which Petitioner contends he is entitled. The Petition appears to  
19 suffer from at least two defects.

20 First, Petitioner has not clearly set forth the grounds that plausibly  
21 suggest entitlement to relief. Habeas Rules 2(c) and 4 require a statement of all  
22 grounds for relief and the facts supporting each ground; the petition should  
23 state facts that point to a real possibility of error and show the relationship of  
24 the facts to the claim. See Habeas Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes to 1976  
25 Adoption; Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005); O’Bremski v. Maass, 915  
26 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended). Allegations in a petition that are  
27 vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, or unsupported by a statement of  
28 specific facts, are insufficient to warrant relief, and are subject to summary



1 dismissal. See, e.g., Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995);  
2 James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d  
3 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).

4 Here, the Petition asserts the BOP erroneously denied Petitioner certain  
5 benefits under three alleged statutory or administrative schemes, that is, the  
6 First Step Act, Elder Offender Credit, and Good Time Credits, based on the  
7 BOP's finding that Petitioner was an organizer or leader in his underlying  
8 criminal conduct. But Petitioner does not describe the applicable programs, the  
9 alleged denials of relief, or any proceedings that led to the alleged wrongful  
10 denials of benefits. Indeed, to the extent Petitioner is seeking relief under the  
11 First Step Act's elderly offender reunification provision, as Petitioner has been  
12 repeatedly advised, 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g) grants the Attorney General, not the  
13 courts, discretion to release eligible elderly offenders, and as such, the Court  
14 cannot grant relief under this statute. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 2022  
15 WL 1488033, at \*2 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2022) (explaining that "this statute does  
16 not empower the Court to release [Petitioner] as an elderly offender"); United  
17 States v. Herrera, 2019 WL 3428835, at \*1 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2019)  
18 (explaining that "the Court is not in a position to adjust his sentence or the  
19 method of his imprisonment since the 'statute merely grants the Attorney  
20 General discretion to release eligible elderly offenders'"). Petitioner also claims  
21 the BOP "reneg[ed] in accepting [his] officially given documents from the  
22 Department of Defense, attached as exhibits, whereby [he is] fully recognized  
23 as a United States citizen . . . ." Not only has Petitioner failed to attach the  
24 referenced documents, he provides no explanation how this has "prevent[ed]"  
25 him from receiving "the appropriate earned benefits." The one-page Petition is  
26 wholly conclusory and vague as to the bases for the alleged claims. As such,  
27 the Petition is subject to dismissal.

1       Second, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners  
2 exhaust all available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief  
3 under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.  
4 2012). Exhaustion aids “judicial review by allowing the appropriate  
5 development of a factual record in an expert forum; conserve[s] the court’s  
6 time because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the  
7 administrative level; and allow[s] the administrative agency an opportunity to  
8 correct errors occurring in the course of administrative proceedings.” Ruwiwat  
9 v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). As the requirement is  
10 not a “jurisdictional prerequisite,” courts have discretion to waive the  
11 requirement in Section 2241 cases. Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045 (citation omitted);  
12 Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may waive the  
13 requirement where administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious,  
14 pursuit would be futile, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative  
15 proceedings would be void. See Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045; Laing, 370 F.3d at  
16 1000.

17       Here, it appears from the face of the Petition that Petitioner has failed to  
18 exhaust his administrative remedies as he argues that the exhaustion  
19 requirement is “no longer . . . a jurisdictional requirement in a 2241  
20 proceeding.” Pet. at 1. As set forth above, the Court agrees that exhaustion is  
21 not a jurisdictional prerequisite; nonetheless, the Court sees no reason to  
22 excuse exhaustion here as Petitioner does not allege that such remedies are  
23 inadequate or that requiring pursuit of administrative remedies would futile,  
24 cause irreparable injury, or would be void. See Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045; Laing,  
25 370 F.3d at 1000. To the contrary, judicial review of Petitioner’s claims, based  
26 on three different administrative and/or statutory schemes (the First Step Act,  
27 the “Elderly Offender Credit,” and BOP Good Time Credits), would be aided  
28 “by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert



1 forum; [would] conserve the court's time because of the possibility that the  
2 relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level; and [would] allow  
3 the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors in the course of  
4 administrative proceedings." Ruviwat, 701 F.2d at 845. Other than noting  
5 exhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, Petitioner does not provide an  
6 explanation as to why the exhaustion requirement should be waived in this  
7 case. His cursory argument that "it is a BOP policy that Unit Team has said I  
8 cannot change, hence, administrative remedies is not available and no forms  
9 were given to me to grieve this policy" (Pet. at 1) lacks specific factual support  
10 and as such, is insufficient to demonstrate exhaustion would be futile here.  
11 Therefore, the Petition is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust  
12 administrative remedies.

### 13 V.

### 14 ORDER

15 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is subject to dismissal. Petitioner  
16 is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, in writing, by **no later than twenty-one**  
17 **(21) days from the date of this Order**, why this action should not be dismissed  
18 under Habeas Rule 4 for the reasons stated above. To the extent Petitioner  
19 contends he has exhausted his administrative remedies, Petitioner is directed to  
20 provide information regarding his efforts to exhaust his claims and attach  
21 copies of any documents establishing that his claims are indeed exhausted. If  
22 Petitioner claims exhaustion of his administrative remedies should be waived,  
23 he shall set forth in detail the facts supporting this contention.

24 If, after review of this Order, Petitioner should decide not to further  
25 pursue this action at this time, Petitioner may voluntarily dismiss the action by  
26 filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil  
27 Procedure 41(a)(1). The Clerk is directed to send Petitioner a Central District  
28 Request for Dismissal form.

1       Petitioner is cautioned that a failure to respond timely in compliance  
2 with this Order could result in this action being dismissed for the foregoing  
3 reasons, for failure to prosecute, and for failure to comply with a Court order.  
4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

5 Dated: February 21, 2023

  
JOHN D. EARLY  
United States Magistrate Judge